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WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?: 
RULE INTERPLEADER, THE ANTI- 
INJUNCTION ACT, IN PERSONAIM 
JURISDICTION, AND M.C. ESCHER 
Plate 'Waterfall" O 1995 M.C. EscherICordon Art-Baarn-Holland. All rights 
reserved. Reprinted by permission. - 
At first glance, the picture above may seem unremarkable; 
the eye is apt to brush over the image uncritically, taking in the 
whole without focusing on the details. On closer examination, 
* Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Yale 
University; J.D., Columbia University. 
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one notices that the structure is physically impossible, pleasing 
to the eye but not of the real world-unless, of course, there is 
some undiscovered place where water spontaneously recycles 
itself from the bottom of a waterfall to the top. Much the same 
problem afflicts one aspect of federal interpleader. Viewed 
quickly enough, it seems to make sense and to represent coherent 
policy. Closer examination reveals that the structure is every bit 
as  impossible as  any that Escher himself could have created.' 
Interpleader is a procedural device designed to settle 
conflicting claims to property usually (though not always) held by 
a non-claimant without exposing the possessor to multiple or 
inconsistent judgmenh2 I t  has existed since the 1300s.~ For 
interpleader to be effective, claimants must not be able to seek 
possession of the stake except in the interpleader proceeding; 
were they able to do so, the interpleader court might enter a 
judgment only to discover that the stake had already been 
delivered to one claimant pursuant to another pr~ceeding.~  
Accordingly, the interpleader court must to be able to enjoin 
either the claimants or other courts from pursuing litigation 
inconsistent with the interpleader action. 
The foregoing is unremarkable, but when the interpleader 
court is federal, the Anti-Injunction Act6 creates special problems 
because of the federalism issues inherent in any federal court 
1. I am not the only person to find the law surrounding federal interpleader to 
be a bit strange. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., properly regarded as the father of 
modern federal interpleader, compared it to the Looking Glass House i n  Barrie's 
classic. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader irz the United States Courts (pt. I), 41 
a YALE L.J. 1134, 1134 (1932) [hereinafter Chafee, United States Courts (pt. I)]. 
2. The property is known as the stake; the beleaguered possessor is known as 
the stakeholder. 
3. Werner Ilsen & William Sardell, Interpleader i n  the Federal Courts, 35 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 2 (1960). That the device existed, however, does not tell the whole 
story. Common-law interpleader apparently existed primarily to determine 
conflicting claims of detinue. Equitable interpleader developed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Two scholars, after exhaustive study, declared common-law 
interpleader "doctrinally irrelevant to modern interpleader." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
& Myron Moskovitz, A n  Historical and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CAL. L. 
REV. 706, 709 (1964). 
4. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Ii~terstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685, 687 (1924) 
[hereinafter Chafe'e, I~~terstate]. See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Federal Interpleader 
Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 414 (1940) [hereinafter Chafee, 1934; 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader in the United States Courts (pt. 2), 42 YALE L.J. 
41,41(1932) [hereinafter Chafee, United States Courts (pt. 2)]; Chafee, United States 
Courts ( p t .  I), supra note 1, at 1136. 
5. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1994). 
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attempt to influence state litigation. As a rule, federal courts 
may not enjoin state court proceedings, nor may they circumvent 
that rule by enjoining state court litigants i n~ t ead .~  This 
principle has existed since 1793,~ the date of the original Anti- 
Injunction Act.' Any attempt by federal interpleader courts to 
affect litigation in state courts must first confront this long- 
standing prohibition and the delicate power issues that underlie 
it. 
Interpleader in the federal courts comes in two varieties, 
known colloquially as statutory interpleader and rule inter- 
pleader. Statutory interpleader came into existence in 1917;' rule 
interpleader is a creature of Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure ("Rule 22" or the "Rule") and made its appearance in 
1938." Congress explicitly permitted injunctions when enacting 
statutory interpleader; for that reason, injunctions in statutory 
interpleader cases--even those against state actions-present no 
Anti-Injunction Act problem." But Rule 22 has no corresponding 
provision.12 Thus, an action under the Rule must either fit within 
6. "It is settled that the prohibition of $ 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the 
order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state 
proceeding." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 
U.S. 281,287 (1970), citing Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 
U.S. 4, 9 (1940) ('That the injunction was a restraint of the parties and was not 
formally directed against the state court itself is immaterial."); see also Hill v. Martin, 
296 U.S. 393 (1935). 
7. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, $ 5, 1 Stat. 334 (current version a t  28 U.S.C. 
$ 2283 (1994)). 
8. Congress has reenacted the statute several times. The only major change in 
its provisions came in the 1948 reenactment, when Congress overruled Toucey v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Toucey interpreted the Act far more narrowly 
than before, perhaps reflecting frustration with how the courts had been treating it. 
"[Bly the 1930's, so many exceptions had been recognized to the Act that some 
commentators remarked that 'except for the prohibition, in some cases, of injunction 
before judgment, the statute has long been dead."' ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION $ 11.2.1, a t  643 (2d ed. 1994) (citation omitted). Congress evidently 
intended the 1948 reenactment to recreate the status quo ante, id. a t  644, but 
subsequent Supreme Court interpretation of the amended Act has given it some 
teeth. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text. 
9. Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (current version codified a t  28 
U.S.C. $$ 1335, 1397,2361 (1994)). 
10. FED. R. CN. P. 22 (1938) (current version at  FED. R. CIV. P. 22). 
11. Injunctions "authorized by act of Congress" are an exception to the Anti- 
Injunction Act's bar. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1994). See irzfra notes 69, 75-76 and 
accompanying text. 
12. I t  is a t  least arguable that i t  would be unavailing to attempt to justify 
injunctions against state litigation with a mere rule of civil procedure. See i~zfra text 
accompanying note 78. 
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one of the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act that does not 
depend on congressional action or forgo the advantages of an 
injunction against collateral proceedings.13 Few courts have 
discussed this problem explicitly, but some have asserted that 
such injunctions are permissible "in aid of' the federal court's 
jurisdiction.14 That is easy to assert, but it ignores the fact that 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the in-aid-of-jurisdiction 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is not available for in 
personam actions.16 
The easy answer to that dficulty, of course, is to regard 
interpleader as an in rem action. But that easy answer runs into 
the considerable difficulty that the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts have made clear that interpleader is an in perso- 
nam action.16 And so, the conflict is revealed. The effectiveness 
of interpleader depends upon the availability of injunctions 
against other proceedings. There is no congressional authoriza- 
tion of such injunctions for rule interpleader cases. If inter- 
' pleader were an in rern action, one of the other exceptions to the 
Anti-Injunction Act might save the day, but the Supreme Court 
has apparently foreclosed that option. 
This article examines that three-sided conflict. Part I1 
discusses the problem in greater depth, focusing first on how 
13. This may raise the question of why one would opt to proceed under the Rule 
rather than under the Federal Interpleader Act. The answer lies in the differing 
requirements of the two interpleaders. There are circumstances in which a case 
cannot satisfy the requirements of statutory interpleader but can satisfy those of rule 
interpleader. For example, if the stakeholder is a resident of one state and all of the 
claimants reside in another state, the minimal diversity required by 28 U.S.C. $ 1335 
is unattainable, though the complete diversity required by 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1994) 
is present. Other things being equal, a litigant would probably prefer to proceed 
under statutory interpleader because its service-of-process provisions are more 
lenient (nationwide service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) versus the customary 
geographical restrictions of FED. R. CIV. P. 4), the venue provisions are easier to 
satisfy (compare 28 U.S.C. $ 1397 (1994) (statutory interpleader) with 28 U.S.C. 
$ 1391 (1994) (rule interpleader)), the amount-in-controversy requirement is less 
($500 for statutory interpleader, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1335 (1994), versus in excess 
of $50,000 for rule interpleader, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994)), and the 
diversity requirement can often be easier to satisfy (any diversity among the 
claimants satisfies statutory interpleader's requirements pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
$ 1335 (1994), whereas rule interpleader requires complete diversity pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994)). But other things are not always equal. 
14. See, e.g., Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 
1960), discussed iufra at  notes 116-21 and accompanying text. 
15. See ii~fra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
16. See ii~fra part 1I.D. 
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interpleader functions and why it depends on being "the only 
game in town." Part I1 next addresses the background and 
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act, exploring particularly 
the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation the Act's provisions 
and discussing the federalism values that the Act and the Court 
seek to serve. Finally, Part I1 reviews interpleader's status as an 
in personam action. 
Even in setting out the problem, one can conceive of at least 
three potential solutions. One might simply acknowledge that 
injunctions are not available in rule interpleader actions. 
Alternatively, one might reverse the Supreme Court's view of 
interpleader as an in personam action, recharacterizing it as in 
rem to get around the strictures of the Anti-Injunction Act. 
i in all^, one might leave interpleader itself untouched but 
reinterpret the jurisdiction exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 
Unfortunately, each of these solutions comes with an unpalatable 
price. Part I11 discusses the price of each solution. 
Part IV considers whether, despite the costs of each solution, 
Congress or the Court should adopt any of them or whether there 
is some other alternative. In fact, there are two alternatives. 
Recharacterizing interpleader as an in rem proceeding to fit it 
within the Anti-Injunction Act is possible, though not the best 
answer because it would require extended judicial effort to refine 
the courts' jurisdictional treatment of in rem proceedings 
generally. This approach is anything but simple and easy to 
implement. The more elegant option is for Congress explicitly to 
authorize injunctions against state proceedings in rule inter- 
pleader actions, and Part IV offers language that does so. 
11. FEDERAL INTERPLEADER AND INJUNCTIONS: GENESIS OF AN 
UNEASY MARRIAGE 
A. How Interpleader Works 
In modern times, interpleader arises most often in the 
context of insurance cases.17 If an insured dies, and there is some 
17. The original interpleader act authorized only "insurance companies and 
fraternal beneficiary societies to file bills of interpleader." Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 
113,39 Stat. 929 (current version at 28 U.S.C. $5 1335,1397,2361 (1994)). Professor 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., noted of the 1917 Act: 'The Act endeavors to secure interstate 
interpleader for the class of stakeholders who need it most, insurance companies." 
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difficulty knowing who the intended beneficiaries of the policy 
are, the insurer confronts a problem. Suppose, for example, that 
the insured originally designated one beneficiary (A) but subse- 
quently may have designated another (B), the paperwork having 
become lost. If A sues the company seeking payment, the 
company may defend on the ground that B is entitled to the 
proceeds. If the company loses, it will pay the proceeds to A. B 
may then sue the company to collect the proceeds. The company 
may defend on the ground that the evidence shows that  A was 
entitled to the proceeds, but it may not use issue preclusion to 
establish that conclusion because B was not a party to the first 
action; due process prohibits burdening B with the results of the 
first action.'' A trial in the second action may therefore result in 
a verdict for B, in which case the insurance company would be 
forced to pay twice.lg Interpleader seeks to avoid this sort of bind 
by permitting the insurance company (the stakeholder) to join all 
competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflict- 
ing claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of 
having to pay more than one time on a single liability.20 
Chafee, Interstate, supra note 4, a t  723. In 1940, commenting on the 1936 expansion 
of the Federal 1nterpleader Act to permit interpleader actions "by any person, firm, 
corporation, association, or society," Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096, 
Professor Chafee observed: 
I t  was hoped that the new law would be helpful to railroads, warehouses, 
banks (especially savings banks) and oil companies, which are all likely 
to be vexed by conflicting claims made by citizens of different states. So 
far, however, nearly all the suits under the present statute have been 
brought by life insurance companies, and very little advantage has been 
taken of it by new kinds of businesses. 
Chafee, 1936, supra note 4, at  381. That hope remains largely unrealized. 'Today, 
the standard case of interpleader is the insurance company confronted by rival 
claimants to the proceeds of a life insurance policy." Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 
3, a t  706-07 (footnote omitted). 
18. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) ("A11 agree that '[ilt is a 
principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not 
bound by a judgment in persoltarn in a litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process."') (quoting 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)). 
19. This was the result in one of the most famous interpleader cases, New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). See irtfra notes 87-94 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Dunlevy. 
20. A stakeholder may assert interpleader offensively or defensively. When the 
stakeholder takes the initiative and brings the first proceeding, seeking to join all of 
the claimants as defendant parties, that is offensive interpleader. On the other hand, 
if one of the claimants sues the stakeholder for the stake, the defendant stakeholder 
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The conventional view is that common law required an  action 
to satisfy a four-part test to be eligible for interpleader: (1) all of 
the claimants had to be claiming precisely'the same property or 
obligation; (2) all claims had either to be dependent upon each 
other or to derive from a common source; (3) the stakeholder 
could claim no interest in the stake; and (4) the stakeholder could 
have no independent obligation to any claimant.21 The initial 
requirement seems a t  first blush to be obvious; there is no 
inherent reason for a party potentially indebted to numerous 
individuals on different claims to be able to compel them to 
submit to a joint adjudication of their diverse claims on the 
may then seek to join the other claimants. This is defensive interpleader. Rule 22 
explicitly contemplates defensive interpleader, noting that "[a] defendant . . . may 
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim," and incorporating 
the additional party joinder provisions of Rule 20 by reference. FED. R. CIV. P. 22. 
The statute does not seem to permit defensive interpleader, discussing only actions 
"filed by any person. . . having in his.  . . custody or possession [a stake]." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1335 (1994). The 1936 statute specifically provided for defensive interpleader. Act 
of Jan. 20,1936, ch. 13,49 Stat. 1096. The current statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 1335, speaks 
only of a stakeholder filing an interpleader action, but statutory interpleader actions 
proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. CIV. P. 22(B), and 
therefore may take advantage of the joinder provisions of Rules 13 and 20. Ilsen & 
Sardell, supra note 3, a t  57-58. For convenience, this article will discuss interpleader 
as  if it were always offensive. 
21. 4 JOHN .POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1322 at  906 (3d ed. 1905) 
[hereinafter POMEROY]. Pomeroy's four requirements, though so often reiterated by 
courts and accepted without comment, may have a questionable ancestry. After an 
extensive review of each requirement and the cases discussing it, Hazard and 
Moskovitz report: 
1. The "classic" requirements for interpleader are not in any proper sense 
classic but in fact are of fairly late origin in the history of equitable 
jurisdiction. 
2. The four requirements for interpleader stated by Pomeroy originated 
as  improvisations ad hoc and achieved generalization and authority by 
virtue of credulous extensions of precedent. 
3. Of the four requirements, one-the requirement that the claimants' 
titles be "derivativen or from a "common source"-is plainly insupportable; 
another-the requirement that the stakeholder not dispute the extent of 
his liability-is the subject of divided authority concealed by the 
suppositious '%ill in the nature of interpleader"; another-that the 
stakeholder have no "independent liability" to either claimant-was a 
response to a now obsolete procedural diffculty; and the remaining 
one-that the claims relate to the "same debt or duty"-is question 
begging. 
. . . [A] fresh start is in order. 
Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 3, at  749-50. That may be, but the courts have made 
none. Rule and statutory interpleader, however, abandon in varying degrees some 
of the common-law rules. See iltfra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. Whether or 
not Pomeroy's four requirements actually existed in historical times, seen from 
today's perspective with modern interpretations they may as  well have. 
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debtor's property. On the other hand, there are many circum- 
stances in which claimants may make conflicting demands for 
different amounts from a common fund, and Pomeroy criticizes 
what he sees as  an  overly strict reading of this criterion to 
exclude such cases from the remedy.22 The second criterion's 
rationale is not clear. Pomeroy explains and criticizes it without 
documenting its origins or purpose.23 Both requirements have 
disappeared from rule and statutory i n t e ~ l e a d e r . ~ ~  
The third criterion did not apply to interpleader in its earliest 
years.26 The requirement of a disinterested stakeholder-the 
strict bill of interpleader-arose in the late 1700s, when the 
equity courts began developing settled rules for i n t e r ~ l e a d e r . ~ ~  
Thus, by 1840 there were "two kinds of interpleader where one 
grew before."27 So, although in the mid-nineteenth century 
Pomeroy described interpleader as  requiring the stakeholder to 
deposit the stake with the court and to retire from the action, 
leaving the claimants to present their arguments without the 
presumably indifferent  takeh holder,^' this description gives too 
22. POMEROY, supra note 21, § 1323, at  2638-39 n.1. 
23. SpecXically, Pomeroy has stated: 
W t  is a manifest imperfection of the equity jurisdiction that i t  should be 
so limited. A person may be, and is, exposed to danger, vexation, and loss 
from conflicting il~deperidelit claims to the same thing, as well as  from 
claims which are dependent; and there is certainly nothing in the nature 
of the remedy which need prevent it from being extended to both classes 
of demands. It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have sometimes 
ignored this doctrine in their decisions, or have been ready to admit 
exceptions to its operation. 
Id.. $ 1324, a t  2640 n.1. 
24. 7 CHARLES A. WRIGHT El' AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (CML 2d) 
$ 1701, a t  489 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE]. 
25. Ralph V. Rogers, Historical Origiits of litterpleader, 51 YALE L.J. 924,932 
(1942). 
26. Hazard & Moskowitz, supm note 3, a t  708. 
27. Id. a t  748. Professor Rogers notes that the terminology "in the nature of 
interpleader" may have existed in equity as early as  1310 in cases similar to 
interpleader. Ralph V. Rogers, supra note 25, a t  949. 
28. Pomeroy described the process as  follows: 
The object of the suit is, that the conflicting claimants shall litigate the 
matter among themselves, without involving the stakeholder in their 
controversy, with which he has no interest. I t  is plain, therefore, that the 
plaintscan obtain no specific relief. So far as  he is concerned, upon his 
filing the bill, and surrendering up the thing or money into the custody of 
the court, his remedy is exhausted by the decree that the defendants do 
interplead with each other, and that he be freed from or indemnified 
against their demands, and that he recover his costs; with the result of 
their dispute he has no concern. 
POMEROY, supra note 21,s 1320, a t  2635-36. 
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much weight to the comparatively late advent of strict inter- 
pleader. Today, both rule and statutory interpleader specifically 
proclaim the irrelevance of this ~riterion.~' 
The .fourth criterion may have existed to keep out of inter- 
pleader's realm cases in which the stakeholder had some incen- 
tive to favor a ~laimant,~ '  although the interpleader device 
contemplated that the stakeholder would deposit the stake with 
the court and retire from the action.31 The status of this criterion 
in federal interpleader today is not as clear, although commenta- 
tors note its decline.32 
29. "It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the . . . [stakeholder] 
plaintiff avers that the plaintiff is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the 
claimants." FED. R. CIV. P. 22. 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person 
. . . ." 28 U.S.C. $1335 (1994). 
30. For example, Pomeroy described the purpose of the fourth criterion as 
follows: 
In the first place, the agent, depositary, bailee, or other party 
demanding an interpleader, in his dealings with one of the claimants, may 
have expressly acknowledged the latter's title, or may have bound himself 
by contract, so as  to render himself liable upon such independent 
undertaking, without reference to his possibility to the rival claimant 
upon the general nature of the entire transaction. Under these 
circumstances, as  the plaintiff is liable at  all events to one of the 
defendants, whatever may be their own respective claims upon the 
subject-matter as  between themselves, he cannot call upon these 
defendants to interplead. He does not stand indifferent between the 
claimants, since one of them has a valid legal demand against him a t  all 
events. . . . In the second class of cases, the independent liability of the 
plaintiff to one of the defendants arises from the very nature of the 
original relation subsisting between them, without any reference to any 
collateral acknowledgment of title, or promise to be bound. The most 
important examples of such relations are those subsisting between a 
bailee and hiwbailor, an agent or attorney and his principal, a tenant and 
his landlord, and the like. In pursuance of the doctrine above stated, if a 
bailee is sued by his bailor, or an agent by his principal, or a tenant by his 
landlord, and a t  the same time a third person asserts a claim of title 
adverse and paramount to that of the bailor, principal, or landlord, a suit 
of interpleader cannot, in general, be maintained against the two 
conflicting claimants, since, from the very nature of the relation, there is 
an  independent personal liability, with respect to the subject-matter, of 
the bailee to his bailor, of the agent to his principal, and of the tenant to 
his landlord. 
POMEROY, supra note 21, § 1327, at  2643-44 (footnote omitted). 
31. See supra note 28. See also Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397,400 (6th Cir. 
1980). 
32. Richard D. Freer, Rethi~tkiiy Compulsory Joirtder: A Proposal to 
Restructure Federal Rule 19,60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061,1109 n.243 (1985) ("mhe trend 
in the cases is that the fourth traditional requirement is no longer a restriction under 
either rule or statutory interpleader.") See also FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 
$ 1706, a t  518-22. 
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I t  requires little imagination to see why injunctions are 
indispensable to i n t e r~ leade r .~~  Suppose a case where the 
disputed property is unique-an auction house holding a valuable 
painting to which there are conflicting claims. Such a case could 
arise if the winning bid had been submitted by an agent and if 
there were multiple possible principals asserting the agency. The 
house might certainly want to have a single proceeding determine 
which claimant is entitled to the painting, and it might bring an 
interpleader action for that purpose. If the action were in federal 
court, its mere pendency would not prevent any claimant from 
proceeding separately against the auction house in state court. 
If the state court then enters a judgment requiring delivery of the 
painting to the state plaintiff, of what remaining use is the 
federal action? 
One may be tempted to solve the unique-property problem by 
requiring the stakeholder to deposit the stake with the court. 
Unfortunately, although that might be an effective solution for 
the interpleader device when the stake is unique, it does not solve 
the problem when the stake is cash or fungible goods. Certainly 
the court can require the stakeholder to deposit the stake with 
the court, but that does not prevent individual claimants from 
bringing independent actions and satisfying judgments from the 
stakeholder's other assets. Unless the disputed stake is the only 
asset the stakeholder possesses, a deposit requirement will not 
ensure the utility of interpleader in the general case. As a 
practical matter for the stakeholder, it is injunctive protection or 
nothing.34 
33. See Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 
1960). 
Usually interpleader will not be really effective unless all claimants are 
brought before the same court in one proceeding and restricted to that 
single forum in the assertion of their claims. To accomplish that end, 
absent voluntary self-restraint on the part of all interested parties, it is 
of course essential that the interpleader court enjoin the institution or 
prosecution of other suits on the same subject matter elsewhere. 
Id. a t  483. 
34. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is 
damages or nothing."). 
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B. The Two Faces of Federal Interpleader 
Modern federal interpleader comes in two varieties that arose 
at different times: statutory interpleader and rule interpleader. 
Congress created statutory interpleader in 1917 in reactio'n to 
New York Life Insurance Co. v. D ~ n l e v y . ~ ~  Before the federal 
interpleader act, interpleader in the federal courts was sometimes 
available through state interpleader  procedure^.^^ Rule inter- 
pleader, of course, came in with the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in 1938.~~ 
35. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). Chafee, Irzterstate, supra note 4, a t  722-23; Chafee, 
United States Courts (pt. I), supra note 1, a t  1136 ('The Durzlevy decision led the life 
insurance companies to obtain the first federal interpleader statute in the following 
year, 1917, in order to bring claimants who are citizens of different states into the 
United States courts."). Accord Ilsen & Sardell, supra note 3, a t  9, 11. 
36. Durzlevy itself involved state interpleader. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. 
v. Germaise, 519 F. Supp. 682, 687 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also, e.g., Huxley v. 
Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co., 184 F. 705 (3d Cir. 1911); 
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 253 F. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1918); Kingdom of 
Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Until 1938, there were 
no federal procedural rules. From 1789 until 1872, the Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, 
2 , l  Stat. 93 (a temporary statute made permanent by Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 
$ 2 , 1  Stat. 275), required each federal court to use the procedural law of the state in 
which it sat as that law had been on September 29,1789, the date of adoption of the 
Act. In 1872, Congress passed the Conformity Act, ch. 255;s 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 
(1872), repealed by Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651,§§ 1-2,48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current 
version a t  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)), which commanded the federal courts to use 
contemporaneous state procedures. 
Professor Chafee, though noting the existence of these cases, also notes: 
However, other decisions take a sounder view in refusing to extend the 
interpleader procedure allowed by these state statutes to actions at  law 
in the United States courts. The Conformity Act does not apply to state 
statutes injecting equitable issues into actions at  law, for equitable 
proceedings are governed by another federal statute, which declares that 
"the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity . . . shall be 
according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of 
equity" unless it is otherwise provided by Acts of Congress or by Federal 
Equity Rules duly made by the Supreme Court. The federal courts have 
insisted that their barrier between law and equity must not be 
undermined by state legislation. 
Chafee, Urzited States Courts (pt. 2), supra note 4, a t  46-47 (footnotes omitted). 
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 22. One of the interesting questions about federal 
interpleader is why, given the existence of statutory interpleader, the Federal Rules 
provided a different form of interpleader at  all. I t  may have been to take advantage 
. of a diversity pattern different from that authorized by the statute (i.e., one where all 
of the claimants were from the same state and the stakeholder was diverse from 
them). Chafee points out that the Rule explicitly discarded the disinterested- 
stakeholder rule, though the statute had not. Chafee, 1936, supra note 4, a t  380. The 
proceedings of the advisory committee give only a hint of the reason for rule 
interpleader: 
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1.. The Characteristics of Statutory Interpleader 
The federal interpleader act now permits both true inter- 
pleader and bills in the nature of interpleader. The statute 
requires only that the claimants seek possession of the same 
property with a value of at least $500, that any two of the 
claimants be of diverse citi~enship,~' and that the stakeholder 
deposit the stake with the court or post a bond in an amount fixed 
by the court.39 There is no requirement that the claimants seek 
precisely the same property4' or that their claims have a common 
origin.41 Thus, the statute dispenses entirely with the second and 
third common-law requirements, modifies the first, and fails 
entirely to mention the 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the statute is the 
provision for nationwide service of process43 with the concomitant 
establishment of,personal jurisdiction by such service.44 While 
Rule 22 deals with Interpleader. and it continues the existing statutory 
or insurance interpleader, a statute recently passed which authorizes the 
service of process in all federal districts. 
. . . In fact, this [rule] is interpleader with the shackles of the require- 
ments such as privity, no interest in the stake, and so on, taken away, and 
made freely available either as  a claim or a counterclaim or otherwise. 
There is really no necessity for having a separate rule on interpleader 
here, in view of the broad provisions of Rule 20 on general joinder, for that 
includes all that is authorized by the interpleader rule. 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON, D.C., OCT. 6,7,8,1938, AND OFTHE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY, OCT. 
17,18,19,1938 66 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1939). 
38. The statute does not require "complete diversity," as does 28 U.S.C. 5 1332 
(1994). Instead, minimal diversity among the claimants is sufficient. In State Farm 
Ins. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court upheld this part of the statute, 
confirming that the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267 (1806), is not a constitutional requirement. 
39. 28 U.S.C. 8 1335(a) (1994). 
40. Id. 8 133503) (dispensing with the common-law requirement of "identical" 
claims). Such a situation might arise, for example, if multiple claimants seek the 
proceeds of an insurance policy but not every claimant seeks the entire amount. See, 
e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Enright, 231 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Cal. 1964). 
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 133503). 
, 42. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
43. 28 U.S.C. 3 2361 (1994). 
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under 
section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all 
claimants. . . . Such process . . . shall be addressed to and served by the 
United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants 
reside or may be found. 
Id. 
44. See Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. Ky. 
1941). 
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this might seem unremarkable today, consider that the Federal 
Interpleader Act arrived in 1917, when the only bases for 
personal jurisdiction were those described in Pennoyer v. Neffed6 
Thus, Congress must have proceeded upon a presence-plus- 
service theory of jurisdi~tion.~~ The Lingering question is whether 
the Due Process Clause permits Congress to do that.47 Congress 
also prescribed wide-ranging venue for statutory interpleader 
actions, complementing the broad jurisdiction and service 
provision: venue is proper wherever one of the claimants 
Except where specifically authorized by a Federal statute, the civil process 
of a Federal District Court does not run outside the district and service 
outside the district is void. . . . Th[e] [interpleader] statute does provide 
that the Court in which the interpleader suit is filed shall have power to 
issue its process against all claimants . . . which process . . . shall be 
addressed to and served by the United States marshal1 [sic] "for the 
respective districts wherein said claimants reside or may be found." This 
statute confers jurisdiction over all the defendants served, even those 
residing in Ohio and Florida. 
Id. a t  187-88. Service under the interpleader statute does establish personal 
jurisdiction, but the courts have limited its scope to the interpleader dispute itself, 
refusing to permit other claims to rely on the same jurisdictional predicate. See iufra 
note 91. 'There is considerable case law and literature dealing with the inequity of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident claimant by means of nationwide 
service of process, thence to subject the claimant to personal liability by cross claim 
which could exceed the amount of the interpled res itself." National Coop. Refinery 
Assoc. v. Rouse, 60 B.R. 857, 862 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986). 
45. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
46. One is tempted to see the jurisdiction as based on residence or domicile, but 
the statute permits service upon the claimants wherever they may be found in the 
United States without requiring that a claimant live in the United States. Thus, 
although at  least one claimant must be a citizen of a state to bring the case within the 
diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. 8 1332 (1994) (made applicable explicitly by 28 
U.S.C. § 1335 (1994)), other claimants may be from other countries. 
47. Although beyond the scope of this article, the implications of Congress's 
action in this respect are fascinating. Note that interpleader almost invariably seeks 
to adjudicate a state-created claim-ssentially a property-rights claim. If Congress 
can decree nationwide jurisdiction for those state claims, could it do so for all state- 
created claims heard in the federal courts? There seems little basis on which to 
distinguish between interpleader claims and other claims presented to the federal 
courts in diversity cases. Of course, if nationwide jurisdiction became available for 
diversity cases generally, that would give plaintiffs an enormous advantage from 
proceeding in federal court, far beyond the desire to avoid "local prejudice" that 
seemingly underlies diversity jurisdiction. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 23-24 (2d ed. 1993). But see CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS 142 (5th ed. 1994) ("The traditional explanation of the diversity jurisdiction 
is a fear that state courts would be prejudiced against those litigants from out of 
state. . . . This explanation for the grant of diversity jurisdiction has been disputed."). 
I t  is ironic that Congress should have created (and maintained) such an incentive to 
forum shop when Erie R. Co. v. Toinpki~u, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), placed such emphasis 
on avoiding it. 
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resides.48 These provisions also explain the great importance of 
federal statutory interpleader. Although all of the states have 
in te~leader ,~ '  it is a device of limited utility when the claimants 
are scattered through many jurisdictions, because there may be 
no state in which all claimants are amenable to personal jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  Thus, the advent of the federal statute with its nationwide 
service and jurisdictional assumption was a major benefit for 
stakeholders. 
The statute also explicitly authorizes the federal courts to 
enjoin claimants from otherwise litigating with respect to the 
stake.61 The injunction that Professor Chafee described as 
essential62 is thus freely available. Interestingly, and perhaps as 
a bow to federalism, the statute describes the injunction as 
running against the litigants, not against state courts.63 
2..  The Characteristics of Rule Interpleader 
Like statutory interpleader, rule interpleader dispenses with 
many of the requirements of common-law interpleader. 
It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of 
the several claimants or the titles on which their claims 
depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but 
are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the 
plaintiff [stakeholder] avers that the plaintiff is not liable in 
whole or in part to any or all of the claimants.64 
48. 28 U.S.C. $ 1397 (1994). 
49. See, e.g., h. R. CIV. P. 22; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 22; CAL. CIV PROC. CODE § 386 
(West Supp. 1995); DEL. CT. C. P. R. 22; DEL. CT. CH. R. 22; KY. R. CIV. P. 22; MASS. 
R. CIV. P. 22; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5 1006 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1995); TEX. R. CIV. P. 22; 
VT. R. CIV. P. 22. 
50. See Chafee, United States Courts @t. I), supra note 1, a t  1134-35 ("[llf there 
are two claimants living in different states, neither of whom can be personally served 
in the state where the other resides, i t  is unlikely that the state courts in either state 
will be able to give adequate relief to the stakeholder.") (citing Chafee, Zizterstate, 
supra note 4). 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) ("[A] district court may . . . enter its order 
restraining them [all claimants] from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any 
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved 
in the interpleader action until further order of the court."). 
52. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
53. The Supreme Court, however, has made clear that for purposes of the Anti- 
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), the difference is immaterial. See supra 
note 6. 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 22. 
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Thus, rule interpleader expressly disposes of the first three 
common-law  requirement^.^' 
The traditional rules that apply to diversity jurisdiction 
govern rule i n t e r ~ l e a d e r . ~ ~  The opposing parties must be 
completely diverse, satisfying the rule of Strawbridge v. C u r t i ~ s . ~ ~  
The amount in controversy must exceed $50,000.'~ Rule 4 
governs service of process,6g and the traditional venue require- 
ments apply.60 Personal jurisdiction, not being covered explicitly 
in the Rule, is governed by the jurisdictional statutes of the states 
in which the federal courts sit.61 
55. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
56. The predominance of insurance cases, see supra note 17 and accompanying 
text, suggests that interpleader based upon federal question jurisdiction will be rare. 
In General Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1991), the court found 
such jurisdiction because of the federal identity of one claimant. In UIU Severance 
Pay Trust Fund v. Local Union No. 18-U, United Steelworkers of America, 998 F.2d 
509 (7th Cir. 1993), the court upheld jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) where 
a trustee under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), " 
29 U.S.C. $8 1001-1461 (1994), brought an interpleader action against rival 
claimants. One asserted entitlement to the fund under ERISA, while the other's 
claim sounded in common-law restitution. Finally, one court upheld federal question 
jurisdiction interpleader in a circumstance in which one of the defendant-claimants 
(a United States agency) asserted a claim under the Federal Medical Care Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. $3 2651-2653 (1994), on the theory that although the stakeholder's 
interpleader action itself was not federal, the court could consider what the 
defendants' coercive claims would have been had they filed them individually, 
analogizing the situation to that presented in declaratory judgment cases. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The 
dearth of reported cases involving interpleader and federal question jurisdiction 
implies that although such cases can arise, they will be a small proportion of all 
federal interpleader actions. 
57. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
58. 28 U.S.C. $ 1332 (1994). 
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
60.. 28 U.S.C. $ 1391 (1994). 
61. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
m h e  federal district courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law 
of their own. Under the Rules of Decision Act. . . they must apply state 
law "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide. . . ." Thus, in the absence of a 
federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is 
determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State. 
Id. at  711 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing iuter alia Lakeside Bridge 
& Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. dei~ied,  
445 U.S. 907 (1980); Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 
1978); Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. dei~ied,  434 U.S. 939 
(1977); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963)). 
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No difference between rule and statutory interpleader is 
more important than the fact that the Rule contains no authoriza- 
tion for injunctions to prevent competing litigation for the stake. 
Other things being equal, that lack would make rule interpleader 
a true poor relation of statutory interpleader; stakeholders having 
the choice would certainly elect the latter.62 The lower federal 
courts, implicitly recognizing the inutility of rule interpleader 
without injunctions, have issued injunctions regularly,63 solving 
the potential problem of the Anti-Injunction Act by declaring such 
injunctions necessary in aid of the court's jurisdi~tion.~~ That 
declaration requires a closer look at  the Anti-Injunction Act and 
the second exception to its otherwise blanket prohibition of 
federal court injunctions of state court proceedings. 
C. A Primer on the Anti-Injunction Act 
It is not possible to identify an immediate stimulus for the 
Anti-Injunction Act." Its early appearance and remarkable 
persistence emphasize the extreme sensitivity of federal-state 
relations. When the Act appeared in 1793, state suspicion of the 
then-new federal government was as great as it has ever been. 
This was the period of the Bill of Rights, the bitter fight over the 
establishment of a national bank, and the Whiskey Rebellion, all 
of which concerned the powers of the federal g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
62. Given the different requirements of rule and statutory interpleader, 
stakeholders may not have the choice. If a stakeholder, for example, shares 
citizenship with any claimant, the case cannot qualify for rule interpleader because 
the complete diversity requirement is not satisfied. On the other hand, if all of the 
claimants reside in one state, the case cannot qualify for statutory interpleader but 
may do so for rule interpleader, provided only that the amount in controversy is 
sufficient. 
63. In Lowther v. New York Life Ins. Co., 278 F. 405 (3d Cir. 1922), a statutory 
interpleader case, the court refused, on Anti-Injunction Act grounds, to enjoin state 
proceedings. Lowther caused Congress to amend the statute i11 1926 (Act of May 8, 
1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416) specifically to permit such injunctiolis. Chafee, United 
States Courts (pt. I), supra note 1, a t  1164 n.lOO. That judicial reticence, however, 
has not manifested itself in rule interpleader cases. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. 
Balbin, 591 F.2d 1040, 1042 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979), mentions the potential Anti- 
Injunction Act problem without speculating upon a solution. There are no reported 
cases explicitly denying injunctive relief in a rule interpleader action on the basis of 
the Anti-Injunction Act. 
64. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text. 
65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at  642 ("Because there is no legislative history 
for the statute, it is unknown why Congress chose to enact this restriction."). 
66. ALLAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
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Moreover, in the same year a s  the Anti-Injunction Act, the 
Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,67 which sparked the 
Eleventh Amendment.68 
While the lower federal courts were given certain powers in the 
1789 Act, they were not given any power to review directly 
cases from state courts, and they have not been given such 
powers since that time. Only the Supreme Court was autho- 
rized to review on direct appeal the decisions of state courts. 
Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two 
essentially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds 
independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court 
of the federal questions raised in either system. Understand- 
ably this dual court system was bound to lead to conflicts and 
frictions. Litigants who foresaw the possibility of more 
favorable treatment in one or the other system would predict- 
ably hasten to invoke the powers of whichever court it was 
believed would present the best chance of success. Obviously 
this dual system could not function if state and federal courts 
were free to fight each other for control of a particular case. 
Thus, in order to make the dual system work and "to prevent 
needless friction between state and federal courts," it was 
necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two 
systems. Some of these limits were spelled out in the 1789 Act. 
Others have been added by later statutes as well as  judicial 
decisions. The 1793 anti-injunction Act was a t  least in part a 
response to these  pressure^.^' 
UNITED STATES 136-49 (5th ed. 1966). 
67. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "'The decision in that case, that a State was liable 
to suit by a citizen of another State or of a foreign country, literally shocked the 
Nation. Sentiment for passage of a constitutional amendment to override the 
decision rapidly gained momentum, and five years after Chisholin the Eleventh 
Amendment was officially announced by President John Adams." Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974). 
69. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 
286 (1970) (footnote and citations omitted). The Court cited the inconclusive, though 
extended, discussion of the Act's history in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 
118, 130-31 (1941) (footnote and citations omitted): 
The history of this provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793 is not fully 
known. We know that on December 31,1790, Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph reported to the House of Representatives on desirable changes 
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. . . . A section of the proposed bill submitted 
by him provided that "no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district 
court to a judgment at  law of a State court." Randolph explained that this 
clause "will debar the district court from interfering with the judgments 
a t  law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff and defendant rely upon the 
State courts, as  far as the judgment, they ought to continue there as they 
have begun. I t  is enough to split the same suit into one at  law, and 
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Whatever the' specific stimuli, the thrust of the Act was and is 
clear: the federal judiciary has quite limited power to enjoin state 
court proceedings. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act 
has solidified that message., 
By its terms the Act permits the federal judiciary to enjoin 
state proceedings in only three circumstances. "A court of the 
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in 
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its  judgment^."^' It  is noteworthy that the Act seeks 
directly to protect the states not from the federal government as 
a whole but from the federal judiciary. This appears to reflect 
two things: first, the underlying suspicion of the federal judiciary 
as a countermajoritarian (and certainly counterstate) institution 
and second, the then-prevailing view that the political branches 
of the federal government were more amenable to state influence 
because of the states' role in declaring the qualifications of the 
ele~torate,~' electing senators, 72and providing the electors who 
another in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing the 
common law side of the question into the State courts, and the equity side 
into the federal courts." . . . 
Charles Warren . . . suggests that this provision was the direct 
consequence of Randolph's report. This seems doubtful, in view of the 
very narrow purpose of Randolph's proposal, namely, that federal courts 
of equity should not interfere with the enforcement of judgments a t  law 
rendered in the state courts. 
There is no record of any debates over the statute. I t  has been 
suggested that the provision reflected the then strong feeling against the 
unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state sovereignty. Chisholrn 
u. Georgia was decided on February 18,1793, less than two weeks before 
the provision was enacted into law. The significance of this proximity is 
doubtful. Much more probable is the suggestion that  the provision 
reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity jurisdiction. 
70. 28 U.S.C. Ej 2283 (1994). For brevity's sake, this article will refer to the three 
areas of permissible federal injunctions a s  the congressional exception, the 
jurisdiction exception, and the judgment exception. 
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, Ej 2, cl. 1: "[Tlhe electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature." The Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments now limit the 
states' ability completely to control voter qualifications for federal election purposes. 
U.S. CONST. amends. XXIV, XXVI. 
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, Ej 3, cl. 1: 'The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof. . . ." 
The Seventeenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, superseded this selection 
method, providing for direct election of senators and reiterating the voter 
qualification rule then applicable for the House of Representatives, but now subject 
to further constitutional limitation. See supra note 71. 
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actually selected the president.73 The Madisonian Compromise 
in the Constitutional Convention concerning the structure of the 
federal judiciary74 reflected the battle between Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists over whether to have a full set of trial and 
appellate courts or whether that would at best duplicate the state 
courts' efforts and at worst invite unwanted exercise of unreview- 
able federal power.75 Consistent with that history, the Supreme 
Court has, for the most part, interpreted the exceptions to the Act 
narrowly. 
The congressional exception seems to brook little interpreta- 
tion. One's first impression is that it should be easy to determine 
whether Congress has expressly authorized injunctions against 
state proceedings, and most of the time it is. The statutory 
interpleader authorization is a good example; it leaves no doubt 
about the courts' injunctive On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted at least one statute to be such an 
authorization despite the absence of a clear statement.77 For 
purposes of this article, however, the congressional exception 
offers no hope for rule interpleader, because there is no statute 
upon which to lean.78 
73. U.S. CONST. art. 11, 3 1, cl. 2: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators 
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: 
but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
74. NEVINS & COMMAGER, supra note 66, a t  135-36. Article I11 reflects the 
Convention's deferring to Congress for resolution of the issue. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 
5 1: 'The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme.Court, 
and.in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish." 
75. WRIGHT, supra note 47, a t  2; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at  2-4. 
76. See supra note 51. See also 11 U.S.C. 5 105(a) (1994); Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. 3 1166(d) (1994). 
77. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), held that the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1994), is such an exception. The statute itself merely 
discusses the general availability of equitable relief, without any mention of such 
relief running against state courts or state litigation. "In what may be one of the 
most bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analysis, the Court in Mitchurn found 
section 1983 to be an 'implied' express exception (an oxymoron if ever there was one) 
. . . ." Martin H. Redish, Absteittioit, Separatioit of Powers, aitd the Liinits of the 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 87 (1984). 
78. See 28 U.S.C. 3 2074 (1994). I t  is important to note the distinction between 
congressional action in passing a statute and congressional behavior in permitting 
a proposed new rule of civil procedure to become effective. To become law, a bill must 
pass both houses of Congress and then either receive the President's signature (or 
grudging acquiescence implied in withholding the signature without vetoing the 
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction exception 
to the Act very restrictively. The leading case is Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive  engineer^,^' in 
which the parties, in state and federal cases, were litigating the 
union's entitlement to picket free from state interference. The 
Railroad unsuccessfully sought a federal injunction against union 
picketing, but later obtained one from a state court. After an 
intervening decision of the Supreme Court in a related case 
upheld the union's right to picket an adjacent facility, the union 
petitioned the state court to dissolve its injunction. The state 
court refused, and the union, rather than appealing through the 
state system, secured from the federal court an injunction 
restraining enforcement of the state injunction.'' The issue for 
the Supreme Court was whether the federal injunction was 
justified under either the jurisdiction or judgment exceptions of 
the Anti-Injunction Act. The Court lost no time limiting the scope 
of both. 
[I]f the District Court does have jurisdiction, it is not enough 
that the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but 
it  must be "necessary in aid of' that jurisdiction. While this 
language is admittedly broad, we conclude that it implies 
something similar to the concept of injunctions to "protect or 
effectuate" judgments. Both exceptions to the general prohibi- 
measure) or have two-thirds support in each house of Congress if the President vetoes 
it. A proposed rule of civil procedure, however, need merely fail to move Congress to 
act in order to become law. If Congress fails affirmatively to override a proposed rule 
between the May 1 submission date and December 1 effective date prescribed by 
5 2074, the rule is law. It is difficult to equate congressional failure to act to block a 
proposed rule with the "express[] authoriz[ation] by act of Congress" that the Anti- 
Injunction Act contemplates. Indeed, the Anti-Injunction Act's great concern with the 
federalism issues inherently raised whenever a federal court enjoins a state court 
strongly suggests that Congress intended not to permit such injunctions unless the 
federal legislative process had run its full course. Congressional failure to override 
a proposed rule is hardly that. 
79. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). 
80. Justice Black's majority opinion attempted to identify the theory underlying 
the union's return to federal court in apparent defiance of the Act: 
[Tlhe argument is somewhat unclear, but it appears to go in this way: 
The District Court had acquired jurisdiction over the labor controversy in 
1967 when the railroad filed its complaint, and it determined a t  that time 
that it did have jurisdiction. The dispute involved the legality of picketing 
by the union and the Jacksol~ville Termi~lal decision clearly indicated that 
such activity was not only legal, but was protected from state court 
interference. The state court had interfered with that right, and thus a 
federal injunction was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 
Id. a t  294. 
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tion of [section] 2283 imply that some federal injunctive relief 
may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering 
with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as 
to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority 
to decide that case. . . . [Vhe state and federal courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court was free 
to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing claims 
in both courts. Therefore the state court's assumption of 
jurisdiction over the state law claims and the federaipreclu- 
sion issue did not hinder the federal court's iurisdiction so as 
to make an injunction necessary to aid that jurisdi~tion.~' 
As a practical matter, the Court has upheld injunctions based on 
the jurisdiction exception only in two circumstances: (1) removal 
jurisdiction, under which a federal court may enjoin further 
proceedings in the state court from which the action came,82 and 
(2) cases in which the federal court's jurisdiction depended on 
attachment of property: jurisdiction that is either in rem or quasi 
in r e n a 3  
81. Id. a t  295-96 (citations omitted). 
82. The Anti-Injunction Act "has always been deemed inapplicable to removal 
proceedings. The true rationale of these decisions is that the Removal Acts qualify 
pro tanto the Act of 1793." Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,133 (1941) 
(citations omitted). One might also argue that such injunctions are a t  least as  
"expressly authorized" as  those issued under 42 U.S.C. $1983 (1994). See supra note 
77 and accompanying text. After all, the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 8 1446(d) (1994). 
explicitly provides that after the defendant or defendants file the removal petition, 
the "State court. . . shall effect the removal and . . . shall proceed no further unless 
and until the case is remanded." 
83. Mandeville v. Canterbury, 318 U.S. 47 (1943), provides the best single 
statement by the Supreme Court of this rule, though the Court decided the case 
before the 1948 amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act then read: "the writ 
of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay 
proceedings in any court of a State." Act of Mar. 3,1911, ch. 231, $265,36 Stat. 1162. 
The Court observed: 
To this sweeping command there is a long recognized exception that if two 
suits pending, one in a state and the other in a federal court, are in rern 
or quasi ira rein, so that the court or its officer must have possession or 
control of the property which is the subject matter of the suits in order to 
proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the court first 
acquiring jurisdiction or assuming control of such property is entitled to 
maintain and exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. 
In such cases this Court has uniformly held that a federal court may 
protect its jurisdiction thus acquired by restraining the parties from 
prosecuting a like suit in a state court notwithstanding the prohibition of 
$ 265. This exception to the prohibition has been regarded as  one of 
necessity to prevent unseemly conflicts between the federal and state 
courts and to prevent the impasse which would arise if the federal court 
were unable to maintain its possession and control of the property, which 
are indispensable to the exercise of the jurisdiction it has assumed. But 
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The Supreme Court has also restricted the scope of the 
judgment exception, as the quotation above suggests. As a 
general rule, the Court has allowed injunctions based on this 
exception to implement the principles of claim and issue preclu- 
sion, reflecting the exception's purpose of overruling Tou~ey.'~ 
The judgment exception might be relevant to interpleader cases 
in the federal courts after they have gone to judgment. Once the 
federal court has adjudicated the rights of the conflicting claim- 
ants and decreed the disposition of the stake, it would be appro- 
priate for the court to ensure the effectiveness of its judgment by 
preventing losing claimants from evading the federal result by 
beginning a state action." I t  is noteworthy, however, that the 
Court has interpreted the judgment exception so that it is 
superfluous unless a state court ignores the normal rules of 
p rec lus i~n .~~  In addition, the judgment exception does nothing to 
protect the stakeholder when a state case brought by a claimant 
concludes before the federal interpleader case. 
Against this backdrop, it is tempting to classlfy interpleader 
cases as in rem or quasi in rem so that the jurisdiction exception 
applies. But that door, as the next subsection shows, may be a 
trap door. 
where the judgment sought is strictly in persoiurin for the recovery of 
money or for an injunction compelling or restraining action by the 
defendant, both a state court and a federal court having concurrent 
jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation a t  least until judgment is 
obtained in one court, which may be set up as res judicata in the other. 
Mandeville, 318 U.S. at 48-49. Since Congress intended the 1948 amendment to the 
statute merely to reestablish the law as  it  had existed prior to Toucey v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), see supra note 8, the change in the statute makes 
no difference to the principle the Court expressed. 
84. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941). See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. See gei~erally WRIGHT, supra note 47, at  304-05. 
85. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24,s 1717, a t  616. 
86. Given the background of the Anti-Injunction Act and the continuing theme 
of federal-state friction in American history, perhaps this is not so odd. Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), arose because of the Virginia 
Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge the United States Supreme Court's position 
in the hierarchy, and as  recently as nine years ago the Attorney General of the 
United States expressed the view that the Court's rulings were not "the supreme law 
of the land." Stdart Taylor, Meese Says Ruliitgs by U.S. High Court Don't Establish 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,1986, a t  1. 
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D. In  Personam Interpleader 
Ironically, the case that spawned federal statutory inter- 
pleader is also the case whose declaration threatens the efficacy 
of rule interpleader. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dun1evys7 is 
both a textbook example of the necessity of the interpleader 
device and an  unwitting partner of the Anti-Injunction Act in 
making rule interpleader less useful. Close examination of the 
facts demonstrates why. 
Effie Dunlevy's father, Joseph Gould, purchased a life 
insurance policy from New York Life. In  1893, after Gould took 
out the policy, he may have assigned it to his daughter; the 
dispute in the case ultimately revolved, inconclusively, around 
that  event. In an  action entirely unconnected with the poliiy, 
Boggs & Buhl recovered a judgment against Dunlevy in 1907. 
Two years later, when the policy became payable, she had moved 
to California. Boggs & Buhl attempted to execute the judgment 
against the proceeds of the policy. New York Life and Gould 
appeared, the latter denying that an  assignment had occurred 
and demanding payment in full. At that point, New York Life 
obtained an  order of the Pennsylvania court permitting it to 
interplead Gould and Dunlevy. The court directed notice to 
Dunlevy in California, but she did not appear. The court awarded 
Gould the proceeds, and New York Life paid him the full amount. 
Of Boggs & Buhl no more is heard. 
In  1910, Dunlevy began a California action against Gould 
and New York Life, establishing jurisdiction by serving both with 
process in California. New York Life defended the California 
action on res judicata grounds, but the lower federal courts (to 
which Dunlevy's state action had been removed) ruled in her 
favor." The Supreme Court affirmed, with the result that New 
York Life had to pay twice, once to Gould as  a result of the 
Pennsylvania proceeding and once to Dunlevy a s  a result of the 
California proceeding. Explaining why the Pennsylvania 
87. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). 
88. Then as now, the predecessor of today's Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 
$ 1738 (1994), required federal courts to give full faith and credit to state court 
judgments. See Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56,2 Stat. 298-99. But also then as now, a 
defect in personal jurisdiction took the relied-upon judgment out of the statute, 
permitting the second forum to ignore the void judgment. See generally EUGENE F. 
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 968-73 (2d ed. 1992); RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 94 (1986). 
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proceeding was ineffective to adjudicate Dunlevy's rights to the 
policy proceeds, the Court rejected New York Life's argument that 
the Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over Dunlevy as  a part of 
the Boggs & Buhl action. 
[ y h e  interpleader initiated by the company was an  altogether 
different matter. This was an  attempt to bring about a final 
and conclusive adjudication of her personal rights, not merely 
to discover property and apply it to debts. And unless in 
contemplation of law she was before the court and required to 
respond to that issue, its orders and judgments in respect 
thereto were not binding on her. 
. . . .  
. . . The interpleader proceedings were not essential con- 
comitants of the original action by Boggs & Buhl against 
Dunlevy but plainly collateral and when summoned to respond 
in that action she was not required to anticipate them. 
. . . . 
The established general rule is that any personal judg- 
ment which a state court may render against one who did not 
voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction, and who is not a citizen 
of the state, nor served with process within its borders, no 
matter what the mode of service, is void, because the court had 
no jurisdiction over his person.89 
Accordingly, the Court concluded "that the proceedings in the 
Pennsylvania court constituted no bar to the action in 
Calif~rnia."~' 
Note that had the Pennsylvania interpleader action been 
viewed as  in rem, even though the Court regarded it a s  separate 
from the Boggs & Buhl suit," jurisdiction over Dunlevy would not 
89. 241 U.S. at  521-23 (citations omitted) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 
Otto) 714 (1877)). 
90. Id. a t  523. 
91. The Court seems to have viewed it as a separate proceeding for due process 
and notice purposes. Its theory is clearly that the original process that Dunlevy 
received in the Boggs & Buhl action cannot have put her on notice that property 
rights unrelated to that dispute were subject to the court's adjudication. See supra 
text accompanying note 89. Thus, even though New York Life apparently 
interpleaded as a part of the garnishment proceeding, the Court ruled that 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Dunlevy's entitlement to the insurance proceeds had to be 
established separately. New York Life relied upon Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 
U.S. 346 (1913), in which the Court, reviewing a proceeding involving an estate, had 
said that "if a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the 
party concerned, it is within the power of a state to bind him by every subsequent 
order in the cause." Id. at  353. But, discussing Ferry, the Dunlevy Court observed: 
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have been a problem, and the resulting judgment would have 
been entitled to full faith and credit in the California action.92 
But the Court's language leaves no doubt that nothing less than 
in personam jurishction in the interpleader proceeding would do. 
Courts since that time have followed this view of interpleader,93 
although some have noted that the law is confused as to the 
proper characterization. 
[Tlhe question is unsettled. While there is broad language 
implying that interpleader is an action in personam in New 
York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, . . . the effect of the holding 
has been diminished by later Supreme Court decisions taking 
a due process approach to jurisdiction and service of process 
and blurring the distinctions between actions in personam and 
actions in rem. This unclarity is noticeable in the lower courts' 
decisions where interpleader has been held to [be] an action in 
The judgment under consideration was fairly within the reasonable 
anticipation of the executor when he submitted himself to the probate 
court. But a wholly different and intolerable condition would result from 
acceptance of the theory that, after final judgment, a defendant remains 
in court and subject to whatsoever orders may be entered under title of 
the cause. 
241 U.S. a t  522. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Enright, 231 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. 
Cal. 1964) (interpleader court lacked jurisdiction to direct one claimant to pay 
disputed amount to another claimant where stakeholder had made preliminary 
distribution to first claimant); Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 30 F. Supp. 
182,188 (W.D. Ky. 1941): 
[The interpleader statute] does not confer jurisdiction over defendants in 
another state against whom a personal judgment is sought by a cross-bill 
filed by a codefendant. Such a proceeding is not an interpleader 
proceeding, and in such a proceeding the cross-defendants are not 
"claimants" as  provided by the statute, but they are defendants in an 
action in personam. 
92. See geilerally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 88, a t  225-31, 963, 968-70. 
93. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 362 (11th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1978); 
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Copeland, 398 F.2d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1968); Kitzer v. 
Phalen Park State Bank, 379 F.2d 650,654 (8th Cir. 1967); Knoll v. Socony Mobil Oil 
Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 289 F. 
Supp. 261,263 (D.S.C. 1968); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dumpson, 194 F. Supp. 9, 
11 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Coumantaros, 146 F. Supp. 51, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
Commentators seem to agree with the courts. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARv. L. REV. 387, 
445 n.231 (1992); Stanley E. Cox, Jurisdictiort, Venue and Aggregation of Contacts: 
The Real Mi~tirnurn Corttacts artd Federalisrn Questions Raised by 01nni Capital, 
Inter~tationul v. Redolf Wolff & Co., 42 ARK. L. REV. 211, 318 n.236 (1989); Steven M. 
Larimore, Exploriizg the Interface Betweert Rule 23 Class Actioru aitd the Anti- 
Iitjurtctw~z Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259,286-88 (1984); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actwiu 
and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 532 (1987). 
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personam, an action in rem, and an action in personam only as 
to the disposition of the funds deposited into court.94 
While most of this quotation may be agreeable, it misses the point 
with respect to the Anti-Injunction Act. For purposes of due 
process and personal jurisdiction, it may make little difference in 
the post-Shaffer era how one characterizes i n t e~ l eade r . ' ~  On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has never retreated from the in 
personam characterization itself, and this view of interpleader is 
very important with respect to whether the device quaMes under 
the Anti-Injunction Act's jurisdiction exception. 
Thus, the three pieces of the picture are in place. Injunctions 
are necessary for effective interpleader. The Anti-Injunction Act's 
general prohibition of injunctions against state proceedings 
appears to preclude rule interpleader injunctions unless they are 
"necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction." The Supreme Court 
has limited that exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to in rern or 
quasi in rern cases, but also has declared interpleader actions to 
be in personam. Unfortunately, as  the next section demonstrates, 
changing any part of this three-cornered dilemma creates 
additional problems. 
There are a t  least three conceivable solutions to rule inter- 
pleader's impossible picture that do not involve congressional 
action. First, one might simply declare injunctions unavailable 
in rule interpleader cases. Second, one might recharacterize 
interpleader as  a proceeding in rern or quasi in rem. Third, one 
might reconceptualize the jurisdiction exception of the Anti- 
94. First Tenn. Nat'l Bank, Chattanooga v. FDIC, 421 F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1976) (citations omitted). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 
F.2d a t  363 ("Courts are not in complete agreement over the nature of an interpleader 
action. Some have indicated that interpleader is an irt rern or quasi in rern 
proceeding, while others have characterized interpleader as ir~persoruzrn.") (citations 
omitted). See also United States v. Major Oil Corp., 583 F.2d a t  1158; Knoll v. Socony 
Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d a t  429; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 289 F. Supp. a t  
263 (all note that the interpleader court's jurisdiction extends only to the stake); Cf. 
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704, 715 (10th Cir. 1971); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Riverview Gas Compression Co., 409 F. Supp. 486, 491 (N.D. Tex. 
1976) (both take the position that the interpleader court cannot entertain unrelated 
in persorturn claims against any claimant). 
96. See infra notes 103-11. 
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Injunction Act, broadening it to include in personam cases. Each 
of these approaches, however, arguably creates more problems 
than it solves. 
A. Rule Interpleader Without Injunctions 
As courts and commentators have recognized, interpleader is 
ineffective without injunctions that limit claimants to one forum 
for a binding adj~dication,'~ so the practical effect of declaring 
injunctions unavailable in rule interpleader cases would be to 
render rule interpleader substantially useless. Stakeholders 
having a choice would certainly opt for statutory interpleader. 
Stakeholders may, of course, favor statutory interpleader in any 
case when a choice exists simply because of its more generous 
service-of-process, jurisdiction, and venue  provision^.^' The 
competitive edge that statutory interpleader enjoys under those 
provisions, however, would be comparatively insignificant if 
statutory interpleader also offered the only possibility of prevent- 
ing claimants from pursuing individual claims against the 
stakeholder. Without injunctions to support it, rule interpleader 
would certainly qualify for the endangered species list. 
B. Interpleader as an I n  Rem Action 
In  some ways, characterizing interpleader as  an  in rem action 
is the most attractive of the three alternatives, because it seems 
not to carry the institutional price of the other two. I t  would not, 
as  a practical matter, destroy rule interpleader, nor would it have 
the broader implications for federal-state relations that reinter- 
preting the Anti-Injunction Act would have.98 .Although the 
institutional price of this solution is not high, it carries a poten- 
tial personal cost to claimants. 
The forum for an  action in rem is determined by the location 
of the pr~perty.~ '  When the disputed property is real estate, that 
result is logical and, indeed, unavoidable because the courts of 
96. See supra notes 4, 34 and accompanying text. 
97. See supra notes 43,48,58-60 and accompanying text. There apparently are 
no statistics kept on the distribution of interpleader cases between those brought 
under the Rule and those brought under the statute. 
98. See infra part 1II.C-D. 
99. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 47, at 83-84. 
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one jurisdiction cannot directly affect title to real property 
situated elsewhere.loO If the dispute involves personal property, 
however, as  interpleader so often does,lO' that logic disappears. 
In  its wake comes the danger that claimants may be forced to 
travel to distant and inconvenient jurisdictions to protect their 
rights. That difficulty is exacerbated because the claimants have 
no power over where the stakeholder takes the property. Indeed, 
a stakeholder who is also a claimant might remove the property 
to a forum known to be inconvenient for many of the claimants, 
thereby enhancing the possibility of retaining the stake. In  a 
related context, the Supreme Court cautioned that chattel should 
not function a s  a defendant's agent for service of process and 
concomitant establishment of jurisdiction.lo2 Shaffer v. Heitner'03 
underlies that pronouncement. There the Court considered 
whether property within a state is sufficient, without more, to 
subject its owner to the power of the forum's courts. Shaffer 
requires further examination, because of both its similarities to 
and differences from typical interpleader cases. 
Heitner, owner of a single share of stock in Greyhound 
Corporation, brought a shareholder's derivative action against the 
company's officers and directors on the theory that  they had 
exposed Greyhound to antitrust liability and a criminal contempt 
sanction. Greyhound was a Delaware corporation.lo4 Heitner 
100. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) ("[Tlhe courts of one State are 
completely without jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States.") (citing 
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Carpenter 
v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891)). The Fall Court did point out that a state may 
indirectly affect title to out-of-state land if it has in personarn jurisdiction over the 
owner by ordering the owner to convey the land. The state may not, however, when 
faced with the owner's refusal to do so, appoint its own officer to act in the owner's 
stead. 215 U.S. a t  6-12. The Fall method is of no use in interpleader, however, 
because the claimants over whom the court requires jurisdiction do not, by definition, 
have title to the property in dispute; the stakeholderholds the title. 
101. Recall that the original federal interpleader statute made the device 
available only for insurance.companies and fraternal benefit associations. See supra 
note 17. Even the 1936 expansion of the Act added categories of stakeholders much 
more likely to hold personal than real property. See id. 
102. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,296 (1980). There 
the plaintiff attempted to use the chattel's presence as a predicate for in persoltarn, 
not in rein, jurisdiction. But after Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), there is no 
difference in standards. See irtfra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. 
103. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
104. After Shaffer and Delaware's legislative response to it, subjecting officers 
and directors of all Delaware corporations to Delaware jurisdiction, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1994), Greyhound's officers and directors sought shareholder 
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invoked the Delaware courts' quasi in rem jurisdiction by 
obtaining sequestration of approximately 28,000 shares of the 
officers' and directors' stock in the corporation. At the time, 
Delaware had a statute making Delaware the situs of all stock in 
Delaware corporations, irrespective of the actual location of the 
stock  certificate^.'^^ The Delaware courts upheld jurisdiction; the 
defendants appealed. 
The Supreme Court seized the opportunity to attempt to 
unify the law of personal jurisdiction. From Pennoyer v. Neffo6 
until Shaffer, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were consid- 
ered separately from in personam jurisdiction for due process 
purposes. International Shoe Co. v. Washingtonlo7 and the 
Supreme Court cases that followed it (even those since Shaffer) 
discussed only in personam jur is&ct i~n. '~~ In Shaffer, the Court 
approval to reincorporate in Arizona, at  least in part to save officers and directors the 
jurisdictional inconvenience of Delaware. David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz, 
The Irnpact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substarttive Law of Corporatior~s, 45 BROOK. 
L. REV. 641, 653-54 (1979). They got their wish. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND  A ATE RIALS 164 (6th ed. 1993). 
105. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8 , s  169 (1991). This statute alters the customary rule 
that "[i]f the intangible interest is represented by a document in which the interest 
itself is merged, as in the case of the ordinary negotiable promissory note or bond, 
claims with regard to it may be adjudicated in the state where the document is 
located." SCOLES & HAY, supra note 88, a t  230 (footnote omitted). 
The true purpose of the sequestration, as Delaware candidly admitted, was only 
incidentally to encumber the stock. 
The primary purpose of "sequestration" as  authorized by [the 
Delaware statute] is not to secure possession of property pending a trial 
between resident debtors and creditors on the issue of who has the right 
to retain it. On the contrary, as here employed, "sequestration" is a 
process used to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident 
defendant to answer and defend a suit brought against him in a court of 
equity. . . . If the defendant enters a general appearance, the sequestered 
property is routinely released. . . . 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at  193 (citation omitted) (quoting the unreported opinion 
of the Delaware Court of Chancery from which Shaffer sought review). The Supreme 
Court later noted the full effect of Delaware's system: "[Tlhe express purpose of the 
Delaware sequestration procedure is to compel the defendant to enter a personal 
appearance." Id. at  209. The footnote which follows this sentence reads as  follows: 
'This purpose is emphasized by Delaware's refusal to allow any defense on the merits 
unless the defendant enters a general appearance, thus submitting to full irt 
persorLarn liability." Id. n.33. Thus, Delaware sought to hold defendants' property 
hostage to ensure the defendants' appearance. 
106. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877). 
107. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
108. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); McGee v. 
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Haneon v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Kulko 
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
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consolidated its treatment of the three types .of personal jurisdic- 
tion. 
Well-reasoned lower court opinions have questioned the 
proposition that the presence of property in a State gives that 
State jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to the property regard- 
less of the relationship of the underlying dispute and the 
property owner to the forum. The overwhelming majority of 
commentators have [sic] also rejected Pennoyer's premise that 
a proceeding "against" property is not a proceeding against the 
owners of that property. Accordingly, they urge that the 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" that 
govern a State's power to adjudicate in personam should also 
govern its power to adjudicate personal rights to property 
located in the State. 
. . . .  
. . . We . . . conclude that all assertions of state-court 
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set 
forth in International Shoe and its progeny.lo9 
Thus, simply saying that an  action is in rem or quasi in rem no 
longer solves an  otherwise-existing jurisdictional problem. 
Shaffer noted, however, that many assertions of jurisdiction 
based upon property would be legitimate even under the mini- 
mum contacts analysis of International Shoe. Property within the 
state is a form of contact between the person over whom the court 
seeks jurisdiction and the state. The Court noted that when 
"claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying 
controversy," jurisdiction will ordinarily exist.l1° That language 
seems perfect to describe interpleader. Claims to the property are 
(1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 
(1990). The sole exception is Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), in which the 
Court repudiated a quasi irt rein jurisdictional assertion that did not comply with 
Shaffer. 
109. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at  205, 212. The final sentence of the 
quotation has been the subject of some dispute among the Justices, though not in a 
way that affects whether interpleader should be regarded as  an irt rern action. In 
Burrzhain, Justices Scalia and Brennan clashed over whether Shaffer's assertion of 
the general application of btterrtotiortol Shoe's minimum contacts standard included 
all defendants (Brennan, J., concuning in the judgment) or only defendants not found 
within the state (Scalia, J., plurality). They agreed, however, that service of process 
upon Burnham while he was in the forum established in persoltarn jurisdiction. See 
495 U.S. 604. 
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at  207-08 (footnote omitted). 
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the controversy. Nonetheless, the Court noted that jurisdiction 
is not automatic in disputed property cases."' 
This precisely highlights one problem of regarding inter- 
pleader as a n  in rem action. Because the subject property is so 
often movable-and not a t  the claimants' instance-simply 
declaring an  interest in property as sufficient for jurisdiction 
effectively makes the property the disfavored "agent for service of 
process" that the Supreme Court condemned.l12 The stakeholder 
could wield enormous power to affect the outcome of the dispute 
by removing the property to a forum chosen either for its substan- 
tive law or its choice-of-law rules.ll3 
This possibility of stakeholder control might appear 
diminished in cases appropriate for defensive interpleader (where 
a claimant commences litigation against the stakeholder, who 
then seeks defensively to interplead the remaining claimants). 
Two possibilities undermine that conclusion. First, if the 
claimant-versus-stakeholder action is in a state court, the 
remaining claimants may not be amenable to jurisdiction. 
Second, the stakeholder may not wish to litigate in the original 
forum and so may commence its own federal litigation, either in 
the forum or in some other state. Although this would create 
parallel litigation involving the same dispute, it is far from clear 
111. The materials the Court cites suggest cases such as where the property 
arrives in the jurisdiction by fraud, for use in judicial proceedings, or without the 
consent of the owner. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 60, 
cmts. c, d (1969); Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a Chattel Atypically 
Rernoved to It, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (1947). Certainly a claimant could contest 
jurisdiction based on the stake's presence, arguing that she did not consent and that 
it is anomalous simultaneously to predicate jurisdiction upon ownership of property 
and to deny her the benefit of the consent rule. 
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
113. A stakeholder might wish to affect the outcome either if it were denying 
liability wholly or in part (i.e., if the stakeholder were also a claimant) or if the 
stakeholder, for whatever reason, favored one of the claimants. 
Although this article concerns only federal interpleader, state law is also highly 
relevant. Because the underlying claims to the property are almost always founded 
on state law, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, the doctrine of Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), generally requires application of state 
substantive law. The federal courts must apply state conflicts law as well. Klaxon 
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Thus, a stakeholder may be able 
to bring the interpleader either in a state that would apply its own (favorable) 
substantive law or in a state whose conflicts principles require application of the 
(favorable) substantive law of another state. 
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that the later-commenced federal action would defer to the state 
action brought by a single claimant.l14 
Thus, regarding interpleader proceedings as in rem cases 
creates some significant problems. All may not be lost, however; 
it may be possible to recharacterize interpleader and yet to cabin 
the in rem jurisdiction that recharacterization would spawn.l16 
Before examining that possibility, however, it is necessary to 
consider whether rule interpleader proceedings as presently 
characterized should quallfv for injunctions under the jurisdiction 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 
C. In Personam Interpleader and the Jurisdiction 
Except ion 
The courts that have discussed injunctions and rule inter- 
pleader have concluded that rule interpleader cases quallfv under 
the jurisdiction exception. In Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. 
v. Revere,ll6 Judge Skelly Wright noted: 
The question whether the court entertaining a non-statutory 
interpleader suit may enjoin state court proceedings on the 
same issues on the theory that it is "necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction" is not free from doubt. Before Toucey v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., such power appears to have been recognized. Not 
surprisingly, afterward, it was denied. But with the 1948 
Revision overruling Toucey and expressly codifying the 
exception, the old rule may be deemed reestablished, and every 
114. Federal courts often defer to pending state litigation, as  is most vividly 
seen in the doctrines of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). There are even 
occasions when federal courts defer to state litigation commenced after the federal 
proceeding. See, e.g., Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995); Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Arguably, the hypothesized case .of parallel state 
property and federal interpleader actions presents none of the predicates for federal 
abstention. There is no dominant state interest in federal noninterference with state 
processes, as  is the case with Yow~ger abstention. There is no specialized state 
expertise or administrative program with which federal litigation would interfere, as 
is the case with Colorado River abstention. And one cannot say that the state 
proceeding is just as likely to resolve the entire controversy as is the federal 
interpleader action, the primary factor upon which Wiltora relied. Given the Court's 
great expansion of Yourger abstention over the last quarter century, however, a 
federal court should perhaps abstain in favor of a parallel state case. See irtfra part 
1II.D. 
115. See ir~fra part 1V.A. 
116. 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960). 
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indication is that, regardless of the Interpleader Act, the power 
of a federal court to enjoin pending state court proceedings in 
a case like this one will be sustained. Certainly that result is 
desirable, if not indispensable."' 
Judge Wright observed that before the 1948 recodification of the 
Anti-Injunction Act, there was no stated jurisdiction exception to 
its prohibition, "but the jurisprudence had nevertheless made 
such a n  ex~eption.""~ The "reestablishment" of the old rule to 
which Pan American refers seems to have been less than thunder- 
ous. Judge Wright cites only two cases, one a declaratory 
judgment action upholding a stay of state proceedings and the 
other where he characterizes the proposition as  dictum, and a 
secondary source.11g Since Pan American, only three reported 
cases have mentioned the injunction difficulty under Rule 22. 
One cites only a secondary source a s  authority for the 
proposition;120 the other two rely largely upon Pan American.121 
Some commentators have attempted to bridge the gap, 
though some of their efforts seem more to highlight the courts' 
sleight of hand than to rationalize it. 
Since Atlantic Coast Line, federal courts have consistently 
applied the necessary-in-aid exception to enjoin parallel state 
117. Id. a t  484-85 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
118. Id. at  486 n.50. 
119. See id. at  486 n.53. 
120. Sotheby's, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058, 1066 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("In 
rule interpleader actions, injunctive relief is available, albeit not pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. 5 2361, in order to effectuate a district court's exercise of its jurisdiction.") 
(citing FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, 8 1717, at  615-16). 
121. The more extended discussion appears in General Ry. Signal Co. v. 
Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1991) (footnote and citations omitted): 
If a plaintiff is otherwise qualified for injunctive relief, the Anti- 
Injunction Act presents no barrier to an injunction sought by General 
Railway in a Rule 22(1) interpleader action. . . . A federal court can issue 
an injunction directed at  state court proceedings . . . if "necessary in aid 
of its jurisdiction." The All Writs Act, consistent with the Anti-Injunction 
Act, provides that 'The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 
A federal court presiding over an interpleader action may stay 
pending state court proceedings involving the same interpled fund under 
the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction 
Act. . . . Judge Wright's reasoning [in Pail Ainerica~t] has garnered the 
support of commentators. 
See also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Frankford Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). 
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court proceedings-even in personam proceedings-when the 
federal actions were brought as rule 22 interpleader cases. 
The crucial factor allowing the use of the exception when 
personal liability is a t  stake seems to be the existence of an  
identifiable property or limited fund. In essence, the presence 
of an  identifiable property or limited fund permits reclassifica- 
tion of the case as in rem.122 
Others, also without much discussion, simply assert the availabil- 
ity of injunctions under the jurisdiction exception: 
[Tlhe mere fact that a nationwide injunction under Section 
2361 is not available in a rule interpleader case does not mean 
that the court does not have discretion in the latter context to 
issue an  order against those claimants that have been sub- 
jected to the court's jurisdiction in accordance with the more 
traditional rules applicable in cases under Rule 22. Certainly 
if the court can assert personal jurisdiction over a claimant it 
has the power to issue an  order designed to effectuate that 
exercise of jurisdi~ti0n. l~~ 
But surely this is too broad an  assertion; it implies that a federal 
court lacks power to issue injunctions against other proceedings 
only when it has no jurisdiction over the defendant. Such a 
reading deprives the Anti-Injunction Act of any effect, a problem 
not lost on, but also not, solved by, the same commentators: 
One argument against recognizing the court's discretion to 
enjoin overlapping proceedings in rule interpleader cases is 
that it might result in a significant incursion on the policies 
embodied in the [Anti-Injunction Act] . . . . But the .  . . statute 
permits a federal court to stay proceedings in a state court 
"where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments." A preliminary injunction to stay a 
state court action while the federal court determines the Rule 
i 
22 interpleader case might be regarded as "necessary in aid of 
its jurisdiction. . . ." Accordingly, the proper accommodation 
between the policy against enjoining state. proceedings and the 
objectives of rule interpleader is to recognize the federal court's 
power to issue an  order whenever a pending state court action 
122. Larimore, supra note 93, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted). Accord Sherman, 
supra note 93, at 531 ('The fact that they involve laying before the court the issue of 
who has the right to property or a fund allows them to be analogized to in rern 
proceedings."). 
123. FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 24, $ 1717, at 615-16. 
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represents a threat to the effectiveness of the interpleader suit 
or the enforceability of its judgment.lZ4 
This is a superficially attractive approach. Read fast enough, it 
appears to make sense. Taken a t  face value, however, it proves 
too much and overlooks the Supreme Court's teaching about the 
jurisdiction exception and the nature of interpleader. 
There are several circumstances in which state litigation may 
threaten the efficacy of a federal action. For example, suppose the 
obligee on a contract brings a diversity action seeking specific 
performance. Simultaneously, the obligor commences a state 
action seeking rescission. The state action, if successful, may 
make the federal action unavailing. If the state case ends first 
and results in a judgment for the obligor, that will cut off the 
federal case because the state judgment must receive full faith 
and credit in the federal court.126 Indeed, whenever there is 
parallel litigation, the state court can, by finishing first, effec- 
tively destroy the federal case. For a case that bears a closer 
resemblance to interpleader, suppose two litigants assert a right 
to possession of a chattel. The nonpossessor commences a federal 
action sounding in replevin. The possessor simultaneously 
commences a state action for a declaratory judgment that he is 
the rightful possessor. Should the mere possibility of inconsistent 
results permit the federal court to enjoin the state action under 
the jurisdiction exception? If the possibility of a conflicting state 
court result were enough to trigger the jurisdiction exception to 
the Anti-Injunction Act, there would be little left for the Act to do. 
Accordingly, one must conclude that the commentators do not 
intend the suggestion that a federal court may issue an  injunction 
"whenever a pending state court action represents a threat to the 
effectiveness of the interpleader to be a general prescrip- 
tion for federal injunctions against state proceedings. More 
likely, they are viewing interpleader as  unique and urging that  
its unique nature requires this extraordinary remedy. As a 
matter of policy, one might agree; it probably is a good idea to 
permit such injunctions. But Congress has not delegated to the 
courts such free-wheeling authority to prescribe federal judicial 
policy in the face of the Anti-Injunction Act. Whether such 
124. Id. at 616. 
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). 
126. Id. 
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injunctions are a good idea or not, the Act stands as  a barrier not 
so easily overcome. In  fact, by concentrating on the unique 
nature of interpleader, the commentators .seem to be trying to 
squeeze it in as  an  in rem case through the back door. The 
difficulties hypothesized for interpleader suits also exist for in 
rem actions. Interpleader is not in rem, however, and the attempt 
fails.12' 
I t  is well to remember that although the motives underlying 
the original Anti-Injunction Act are not clear, the Supreme Court 
has taken the position that it was intended to prevent state- 
federal court friction.12' Accepting that as  the purpose of the Act, 
obviously Congress could not simultaneously have contemplated 
that  the federal courts should decide for themselves when it 
would be a good idea to grant an  injunction against state proceed- 
ings. This seems particularly the case with respect to rule 
interpleader, which, after all, is based not on an  act of Congress 
but instead upon a rule of procedure that originates with the 
federal courts themselves, the very institution to be restrained by 
the Act. 
The Court has implicitly recognized that the jurisdiction 
exception will swallow the rule unless carefully cabined. The 
difficulty in describing interpleader to bring it within the 
jurisdiction exception without simultaneously including other 
cases to which the Anti-Injunction Act has long applied strongly 
suggests that what might first appear to be only a modest 
expansion of the jurisdiction exception is ill-advised. The Anti- 
Injunction Act reflects a delicate balancing of federal and state 
interests and power, and reinterpreting an  exception in a way 
that would greatly expand (even if unintentionally) the numbers 
and kinds of cases in which a federal court may enjoin a state 
proceeding would have enormous implications for federalism. 
The Court has often cautioned that the federal judiciary should 
be particularly cautious about upsetting the federalism balance 
by invading state prerogatives and interfering with state func- 
127. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
128. CHERMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 642 (citing Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend 
Corp., 433 U.S. 623,630 (1977); Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 
(1957)). 
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tions.lZ9 An acceptable solution to the problem of rule inter- 
pleader and injunctions does not lie here. 
D. Rule Interpleader Injunctions as Exceptions to the 
Younger Abstention Doctrine 
Younger v. Harrisl3' has come to be synonymous with an 
abstention doctrine that actually antedates the case by nearly a 
century.l3l Briefly stated and somewhat oversimplified, it 
declares that federal courts should not interfere with pending 
state criminal proceedings unless the federal plaintiff will suffer 
great, immediate, and irreparable harm in the absence of federal 
intervention and has no adequate remedy at  law.132 Younger 
made plain as well that the opportunity to raise a federal 
constitutional claim in the state criminal process is a remedy at 
law sufficient to preclude federal court in ter~ent i0n. l~~ 
129. One manifestation of this came in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 
U.S. 118,(1941), when the Court refused to endorse a federal injunction against a 
state proceeding that threatened completely to ignore the res judicata effect of a final 
federal judgment. Characterizing the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court noted: 
Section 265 is not an isolated instance of withholding from the federal 
courts equity powers.possessed by Anglo-American courts. As part of the 
delicate adjustments required by our federalism, Congress has rigorously 
controlled the "inferior courts" in their relation to the courts of the 
states. . . . 
The guiding consideration in the enforcement of Congressional policy 
was expressed by Mr. Justice Campbell, for the Court . . . : 'The legis- 
lation of Congress, in organizing the judicial powers of the United States, 
exhibits much circumspection in avoiding occasions for placing the 
tribunals of the States and of the Union in any collision." 
We must be scrupulous in our regard for the limits within which 
Congress has confined the authority of the courts of its own creation. 
Id. a t  141 (citation omitted). Congress's subsequent repudiation of the specific 
holding of Toucey, see supra note 8, does nothing to undermine the Court's cautious 
approach generally. The Court's five abstention doctrines, under Railroad Comm'n 
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. 
Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), also demonstrate its deeply felt reluctance to 
permit the federal judiciary even to appear to invade an area occupied by state 
judicial power. 
130. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
131. For an excellent discussion of the history of Younger abstention, see Donald 
H. Zeigler, An Accornrnodation of the You~zger Doctrirre and the Duty of the Federal 
Courts to Enforce Corlstitutw~tal Safeguards in the State Crirninul Process, 125 U. PA. 
L. REV. 266 (1976). 
132. Younger, 401 U.S. at  45-46. 
133. Id. a t  46. 
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In  the years following Younger, the Court extended the 
doctrine to include proceedings not themselves criminal in nature 
but "in aid of and closely related to" state criminal  proceeding^,'^^ 
state judicial proceedings in which the state was a party,136 a 
contempt proceeding in an  action involving private parties,136 a 
purely civil proceeding involving state officials and state child 
neglect laws,13' state administrative proceedings,138 and a purely 
private civil proceeding not involving the state's contempt 
power.13' The Court has also permitted a later-commenced state 
criminal proceeding to oust a federal court of jurisdiction when 
the latter had not yet conducted "proceedings of substance on the 
merits."140 The doctrine is, in its modern form, one of great scope, 
imposing significant restraints on the federal courts' abilities to 
entertain litigation involving issues also of interest to the state 
courts. 
Statutory interpleader does not implicate Younger concerns, 
probably because it would be unseemly for the Court to impose a 
judge-made abstention doctrine to override a specific legislative 
authorization of injunctions against state proceedings.141 But the 
injunctions entered in rule interpleader proceedings do seem to 
collide with the Younger doctrine. In  cases where a claimant has 
filed a state action against the stakeholder only to be precluded 
by a later-entered federal injunction in an  interpleader action, 
134. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,604 (1975). The Court described the 
state's nuisance proceeding in Huffinait a s  "more akin to a criminal prosecution than 
are most civil cases." Id. 
135. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
136. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
137. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
138. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
139. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
140. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,349 (1975). See also Wilton v. Seven Falls 
Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995), in which the Court ordered abstention where a later- 
commenced state civil suit between private parties sought to adjudicate the same 
issues a s  were involved in the earlier-commenced federal declaratory judgment 
action. Abstention here, however, was based on Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), rather than on Your~ger. Wilto~t, 115 S. 
Ct. a t  2140. 
141. See 28 U.S.C. 5 2361 (1994). For the Court to do so without creating a 
constitutional crisis, i t  would have to find that Younger abstention expresses a 
constitutional imperative, making that part of the interpleader act unconstitutional. 
Although one commentator has argued that Younger is constitutionally based, see 
Calvin R. Massey, Absterttwrt artd the Cortstitutwlml Lirnits of Judicial Power of the 
United States, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, the courts have not sounded that  theme. 
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Younger seems clearly to be relevant. Even in cases where the 
federal rule interpleader action begins before independent state 
actions by claimants against the stakeholder, a rapid claimant 
response to the federal litigation in the form of an individual 
action against the stakeholder appears to present the sequence of 
actions found to require federal abstention in Hicks v. mi rand^'^^ 
and Wilton v. Seven Falls C O . ' ~ ~  
It  seems at  least arguable, therefore, that when the federal 
courts issue injunctions against other actions during the course 
of litigating a rule interpleader case, they create a de facto 
exception to the scope of Younger abstention. After all, if federal 
intervention in an action between two private companies impli- 
cates Younger, as happened in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, I ~ c . , ' ~ ~  it is 
difficult to see why entering an injunction in a rule interpleader 
situation would not. While that; is hardly more offensive than sub 
silentio either creating additions to the Anti-Injunction Act14' or 
revising the Supreme Court's characterization of interpleader as 
an in personam action,146 it does add to the Looking Glass quality 
of the law surrounding federal interpleader. The present system 
works as long as no one stops to ask what is really happening or 
to examine the law's consistency and observation of its own 
tenets. 
There are, however, two approaches that would reconcile the 
existing discord. As the next part shows, recharacterizing 
interpleader as an in rem action might solve the problem, 
provided that jurisdictional principles receive their due rather 
than being consigned to analysis by label. That is not the better 
solution, however. ' The cleaner, less troublesome answer should 
come from C~ngres s . ' ~~  
142. 422 U.S. 332. 
143. 115 S. Ct. 2137. 
144. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
145. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1994). See supra part 1II.C. 
146. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
147. An assertion that the easier, better answer lies with Congress deserves to 
be met with a certain skepticism. That Congress does hold the key perhaps 
demonstrates better than extensive analysis how seriously flawed the present 
accommodation of rule interpleader and the Anti-Injunction Act is. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS THAT WILL WORK (BETTER) 
A. Recharacterizing Interpleader 
It  might seem tempting simply to recharacterize interpleader 
as an  in rem proceeding, overruling D ~ n l e v y ' ~ ~  and bringing 
interpleader within the ambit of the jurisdiction exception. The 
"simple" approach, however, would require extended judicial 
involvement because of the uncertainties left by Shaffer v. 
Heitner.14' Shaffer trod a middle ground with respect to in rem 
cases. It  did not leave them untouched, a t  least by dictum, yet it 
furnished no clear rules for how the new regime would apply. We 
have only Justice Marshall's cryptic statements that jurisdiction 
will normally exist in such cases.l6' This solution, therefore, 
would place an  immediate and continuing burden on the courts 
to clanfy when property within the forum is a sufficient jurisdic- 
tional predicate and, when it is not, to articulate what additional 
factors the courts should consider. 
That job, however, is not impossible. Indeed, taking seriously 
Shaffer's teaching that all jurisdictional assertions must meet the 
in personam standards of International Shoe requires recognizing 
that the distinction between in personam and in rem is of no 
consequence whatever for jurisdictional purposes, having 
significance only for the Anti-Injunction Act. However true that 
may be, it does not avoid the problem; it merely pastes a different 
label on it. The fact is that neither the Supreme Court nor the 
inferior federal courts have been notably active since Shaffer in 
elaborating the circumstances in which property within the forum 
suffices to establish jurisdiction. That is work that the courts 
would have to do.''' 
148. See supra part 1I.D. 
149. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. 
150. Id., a t  207-08 (footnote omitted). See supra note 110 and accompanying 
text. 
161. The courta should already be engaged in this process for rule interpleader. 
Statutory interpleader avoids the problem because Congress has created nationwide 
jurisdiction. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Rule interpleader does 
not enjoy such an advantage, so theoretically, a t  least, the federal courts are even 
now engaged in evaluating this irt persolwin device for jurisdictional purposes, 
presumably using the stake--the property-as one of the relevant contacts. The 
difficulty here is that there are very few reported cases discussing the jurisdictional 
issues. 
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The courts must confront the question of how much contact 
between claimant and forum is enough to support jurisdiction. 
When the stake is movable, the courts should be reluctant to 
declare that its mere presence subjects all claimants, irrespective 
of their other contacts with the forum, to jurisdiction. After all, 
that pattern bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the chattel- 
as-agent variation that the Court disparaged in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood~on. '~~ I t  is not even as  strong a case 
for jurisdiction as World- Wide. .At least in World- Wide, the Court 
hypothesized that the defendant was able to anticipate that its 
product could reach the forum.163. That will often not'be possible 
for claimants, most or all of whom have never had control of the 
stake. 
The failure of simple presence of the stake as  a jurisdictional 
predicate thrusts upon the courts the job of analyzing all of the 
other contacts with the forum of each claimant. It will be 
necessary to consider factors such as whether each claimant 
(1) anticipated having an  interest in the stake and knew it would 
be in the forum, (2) knew that the stake might travel to the forum 
even if the claimant had no long-standing expectation of a n  
interest in the stake or knowledge of its whereabouts, and (3) had 
any contact with or control over either the stakeholder or the 
person or entity that created the claimant's interest in the 
stake.lS4 On top of these ethereal considerations, the courts will 
also have to consider the now-traditional factors under the 
heading of "convenience."1s6 Although this may be the stuff of 
152. 444 U.S. 286,296 (1980). See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
153. World-Wide, 444 U.S. a t  287. 
154. These factors reflect the focus of modern jurisdictional analysis on forum 
contacts, as  begun in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). and 
continued in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Although the Court pointed out in each of those 
cases that foreseeability of forum involvement standing alone is insufficient to 
establish jurisdiction, it clearly is a relevant factor. 
155. In World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286, Justice White's majority opinion noted 
several factors as significant to the jurisdictional inquiry, though in his view clearly 
subordinate to minimum contacts as guarantors both of defendants' individual liberty 
interests and states' sovereignty limitations. Those factors included the degree of 
inconvenience to the defendant if required to litigate in the forum, the forum's 
interest in the application of its own law to the case, and whether the forum is the 
most convenient place for litigation. Id. a t  294. Justice Brennan's dissent took no 
issue with the particular factors but argued that the majority's hierarchy accorded 
them "too little weight." Id. at  299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Burger Kiitg, 471 
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which first-year Civil Procedure examinations are made, it is 
probably not a good recommendation for a predictable, easy-to- 
administer legal structure. 
In addition to the complexities of fitting the newly-character- 
ized in rem case into the analytical structure of jurisdiction, this 
proposed solution sidesteps, the real issue. The underlying 
problem is not establishing jurisdiction in doubtful cases; it is 
justifying issuance of injunctions in rule interpleader cases, even 
those in which jurisdiction may present no problem at  
Accordingly, it seems better to attack the Anti-Injunction Act 
problem head-on. 
B. A Capitol Solution 
The cleanest way to rationalize the impossible picture now 
presented by injunctions in rule interpleader cases is for Congress 
to make rule interpleader an express exception to the general 
prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act. Amending Rule 22 
probably would not suffice. The Anti-Injunction Act speaks of 
something "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although Congress must at least 
acquiesce in them, are not themselves congressional acts.16' 
Congress could either pass an entirely new statute applying 
specifically to rule interpleader or amend the section of the 
federal interpleader act that grants injunctive power in statutory 
interpleader cases168 to include rule interpleader cases. For 
example, the amended statute might read: 
U.S. 462, Justice Brennan achieved a majority and apparently gave the convenience 
factors approximately equal weight. Id. at  482-84. Finally, in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 
eight justices endorsed jurisdictional analysis predicated partially on those factors. 
Id. at  112-15. Justice Scalia, the ninth, did not explicitly disagree, but he did not join 
Part 11-B of Justice O'Connor's opinion, possibly because he accepted the hierarchy 
implied by Justice White in World-Wide and therefore felt discussion of the 
convenience factors to be dictum given Asahi's posture. Id. at  104. 
156. It is not hard to hypothesize such a case. In a circumstance in which all of 
the claimants reside in one state and the stakeholder (perhaps an insurance company 
or the fiduciary of an estate) resides in another, the stakeholder may elect to bring 
a rule interpleader proceeding in the federal courts of the claimants' common 
domicile. Subject matter jurisdiction would exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), 
(assuming that the stake was worth more than $60,000), and domicile obviously 
suffices to establish personal jurisdiction. 
157. See supra note 78. 
168. 28 U.S.C. 4 2361 (1994). 
Heinonline - -  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 592 1996 
19961 WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? 593 
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of inter- 
pleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may 
issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restrain- 
ing them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any 
State or United States court affecting the property, instrument 
or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further 
order of the court. A district court may also issue such orders 
in civil actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader 
maintained under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure. . . . 
4 
This solution eliminates the problem of unauthorized injunctions 
in rule interpleader actions without casting the courts adrift on 
the seas of a new and unfamiliar jurisdictional inquiry.15' As 
proposed, the statute does not change the limitation of rule 
interpleader to "traditional" rather than "national" jurisdictional 
rules.'60 I t  merely addresses the problem that nobody talks 
about. 
I t  is difficult to hypothesize a policy reason for statutory, but 
not rule, interpleader to enjoy an express exemption from the 
Anti-Injunction Act, a statute designed to protect the states' place 
in the federal structure. There do not seem to be greater federal- 
ism stresses from enjoining state proceedings in rule interpleader 
cases than in statutory interpleader  case^.'^' That there are no 
reported cases refusing injunctions in rule interpleader cases on 
Anti-Injunction Act grounds connotes that there is no fundamen- 
tal federalism policy battle going on here. The only thing 
happening is that the inferior federal courts are issuing injunc- 
tions in rule interpleader actions in apparent (but unspoken) 
defiance of Supreme Court declarations about the Anti-Injunction 
Act and the nature of interpleader. That combination has the 
159. This would also eliminate whatever Younger problems might otherwise 
arise from a federal court's refusal to abstain because of a parallel state court 
proceeding. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
160. I t  would be simple enough to amend the statute to provide nationwide 
jurisdiction in rule interpleader cases as  well, and 1 confess that it is not readily 
apparent to me why only one of the interpleader devices should enjoy this advantage. 
That, of course, begs the question of whether Congress can accomplish this result 
constitutionally. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. . 
161. Perhaps Congress should consolidate the two types of interpleader into a 
single proceeding with alternative jurisdictional and venue requirements. There 
seems to be little reason to segregate rule and statutory interpleader, and it is not 
clear why they grew up separately in the fvst place. See supra notes 35-37 and 
accompanying text. 
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water of the 1aw:running uphill. Like Escher's "Waterfal1,"if one 
looks at it quickly enough, the picture is untroubling. If one looks 
carefully, the image is impossible and int01erable.l~~ 
There is, without doubt, the temptation to brush the problem 
aside. Rule interpleader has been functioning since 1938 with the 
aid of injunctions. Stakeholders and claimants have not com- 
plained. The states, which the Anti-Injunction Act theoretically 
protects from the incursions of the federal judiciary, have not 
complained either. And the de facto principle that injunctions 
against state proceedings may issue in in personam actions has 
not threatened to spread beyond the bounds of rule interpleader. 
What is the harm? 
The harm is to the structure of the law. No matter how 
complex, the law ought to make sense; it ought to be internally 
consistent. When the law "ignores itself," it diminishes respect 
for the law. The courts have not always resisted inconsistency. 
One of the best known examples occurs in the Eleventh Amend- 
ment area. In Ex parte the Court's analysis of the 
Eleventh Amendment and of Hans v. L ~ u i s i a n a ' ~ ~  led it to declare 
a state attorney general both a private citizen and a state official 
when performing the same act. The Court then seized separately 
upon attributes of each of those statuses and combined them to 
permit the action to go forward. Ex parte Young is one of the 
most important constitutional cases of the twentieth century,165 
162. See supra pages 551-52. 
163. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
164. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
165. Justice Brennan has described Exparte Youltg as  
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the 
Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers 
secured elsewhere in the Constitution. During the years between Osborlt 
and Youltg, and particularly after the Civil War, Congress undertook to 
make the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional rights. . . . 
The principal foundations of the expanded federal jurisdiction in 
constitutional cases were the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . which in 5 1 
empowered the federal courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of actions 
of any person taken under color of state [law] . . . and the Judiciary Act of 
1875 . . . which gave lower federal courts general federal-question 
jurisdiction . . . . These two statutes, together, after 1908, with the 
decision in Exparte Young, established the modern framework for federal 
protection of constitutional rights from state interference. 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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yet commentators have ridiculed the manner in which the Court 
reached the re~u1t . l~~  It benefits neither the Court nor the law to 
engage so patently in irrationality. 
Hazard and Moskovitz, explaining the underlying need for 
inter~leader, '~~ also unintentionally highlighted the dilemma that 
confronts the courts in rule interpleader cases today. Inter- 
pleader must have injunctions to be an effective remedy. Under 
established Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence, only in rem actions 
justify federal injunctions under the jurisdiction exception. 
Interpleader is an in personam action. The courts thus face 
conflicting demands of law and practicality similar to those that 
confront Hazard and Moskovitz's stakeholder. 
This is not only a grave matter, it is a subversion of the very 
basis of the legal order. I t  is intolerable that a legal system 
should come down a t  the point of application to tell someone 
[perhaps especially a court] that he has orders such that he 
cannot help but disobey. It  is subversive of the legal order that 
this be done, for a social order that is not a police state 
requires general voluntary obedience to the rules and this in 
turn requires general, and certainly official, assent that the 
Justice Brennan also noted that "'the doctrine of Exparte Young seems indispensable 
to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."' Id. a t  110 
(quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 186 (2d ed. 
1970)). 
166. For example, one scholar claimed: 
[In Ex parte Youitg] the Court . . . unveiled one of the most remarkable 
sophistries in its history. . . . 
If the statute is unconstitutional, the person charged with its 
enforcement is shorn of his off~cial insignia and acts only in hie private 
capacity. Therefore, a suit against him is not against the state and does 
not affront the eleventh amendment. Contrariwise, under a constitutional 
statute the eleventh amendment attaches to the public official and to the 
state which he personifies. Constitutionality thus becomes the litmus. If 
a statute is unconstitutional, judicial sorcery recasts city policeman as 
private eye. 
Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Crirninal Law and the First Ameradmeist, 
49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740,763 (1974). 
167. Hazard and Moskovitz explained the need for interpleader as  follows: 
The principal point to be recognized is that the middleman [stakeholder] 
does not simply confront a dilemma [as to whom to pay first]-the debtor 
with two creditors does that-nor does he simply face "double or multiple 
liability-the railroad with the train wreck is in that position. Rather 
the middleman that interpleader seeks to help is a man facing a dilemma 
that is caused by the fact that the law (incipiently if not yet actually) is 
addressing him with conflicting commands. . . . [I]f no procedure exists for 
reconciling the results [of separate litigation], the middleman is 
confronted with two commands one of which he must violate. 
Hazard & Moskovitz, supra note 3, at  752. 
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rules are to be taken seriously as binding obligations. It is . 
impossible for them so to be taken if the only sensible response 
to official command[s] is to laugh or cry or to fight or lie down. 
. . . The legal sovereign can tolerate a lot of sloppiness and 
a lot of error in its administration. It can even swallow the 
incongruities of reaching contradictory decisions on identical 
law and similar facts, as in the train wreck situation [that 
produces some verdicts for passenger plaintiffs and some for 
the railroad defendant]. But it cannot even for a brief interval 
rest officially indifferent to the fact that on a particular 
occasion it was talking out of both sides of its mouth, and 
uttering a command that it knew it could not enforce.16' 
Federal courts today confront a situation in which either they 
must eviscerate rule interpleader by refusing injunctions or 
ignore either the Anti-Injunction Act or the Supreme Court's 
characterization of interpleader as an in personam action. They 
have been unwilling to do the first and consequently have thrust 
themselves into repeatedly doing one of the latter two, but 
without admitting it. Such action is, a t  the least, unseemly. 
The incompatibility that exists in the law of rule interpleader 
is not the worst in the law nor the greatest threat to the law's 
harmony. But allowing injunctions in in personam cases under 
the jurisdiction exception to the Anti-Injunction Act invites 
expansion of that exception, eroding the Act's underlying p01icy.l~~ 
That would have major implications for federalism. There is no 
need for the law to cast itself in disrepute or for the courts to 
continue, perhaps unwittingly, to pretend that the problem is not 
there. "Waterfall" is great art  but terrible architecture. Congress 
can recognize and solve the problem with rule interpleader, and 
it should. 
168. Id. at 752-53 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
169. One might see expansion along the lines hypothesized earlier, where an 
obligee and an obligor in a contract dispute each begin a separate action, one in state 
court and one in federal court, and the federal plaintiff seeks then to enjoin the state 
action. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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